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We seek to develop the conceptual and practical understanding of causal ambiguity.
Specifically we extend current thinking by setting out three types of causal ambiguity,
based on whether firm resources are perceived to display linkage and/or characteristic
ambiguity, and by examining for each type the impact of causal ambiguity on the
sustainability of competitive advantage and on rent appropriation. We highlight the
difficulties decision-makers face when they perceive ambiguity and finally we explore
some implications of ambiguity with respect to resource-creation processes.
Introduction
The resource-based view (RBV) examines the link between the internal characteristics of
a firm and firm performance (Barney, 1991; Barney and Arikan, 2001). It suggests
that resources that are simultaneously valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and
imperfectly substitutable are a firm’s main source of sustainable competitive
advantage; these resources generate rents (Barney, 1991). However, as argued by
Priem and Butler (2001) there is still a lack of understanding about exactly how rents
are generated and appropriated. Rents persist partly because of the presence of
isolating mechanisms that prevent other firms from replicating resources (Rumelt,
1984). Causal ambiguity is one of these mechanisms and it refers to situations where
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the causal connections between actions and performance are unclear and hence the
factors responsible for performance differentials are difficult to identify (Lippman and
Rumelt, 1982). Causal ambiguity limits competitive imitation because competitors do
not know the underlying reasons for a rival firm’s effectiveness and so they cannot
identify what they should be imitating (Rumelt, 1987).
It is also possible that managers inside a firm may not fully understand their own
firm’s sources of advantage (Barney, 1991). Szulanski (1996) argues that reducing
internal ‘stickiness’ (which relates to the difficulty of transferring knowledge within a
firm) can be key to a firm’s ability to achieve sustainable competitive advantage,
and that causal ambiguity is one of the main impediments to the transfer of
best practice within an organization. Hence, while causal ambiguity is an isolating
mechanism impairing the transfer of valuable activities across rival firms, it can
also hinder the movement of valuable knowledge within the firm. Thus the
effects of causal ambiguity on the sustainability of competitive advantage are mixed
(McEvily, Das and McCabe, 2000).
There are a few studies specifically dedicated to the topic (Ambrosini and Bowman,
2005; Blyler and Coff, 2003; King, 2007; King and Zeithaml, 2001; Mosakowski,
1997; Powell, Lovallo and Caringal, 2006; Simonin, 1999; Szulanski, Cappetta and
Jensen, 2004) (see Table 1 for these papers’ key points). However, despite it being
a core concept in the RBV causal ambiguity is still in need of clarification, and
remains relatively under-explored (King, 2007; King and Zeithaml, 2001).
Our purpose here is to respond to King (2007)’s call for further research into the
impact of causal ambiguity on firm resources and firm performance. We aim to
extend our current understanding of causal ambiguity specifically by developing
some insights into the effects of its presence on sustainable competitive advantage
and on rent appropriation. Resource-based competitive advantages may generate
rents, but these rents may be appropriated by other stakeholders, e.g. employees,
through the exercise of their bargaining power (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000;
Coff, 1999; Peteraf, 1993). Hence competitive advantages may not lead to
improved firm financial performance if rents are captured by other stakeholders.
Table 1. Causal ambiguity: some key contributions
Authors and date Articles’ key points
Lippman and Rumelt (1982) The first to propose a definition of causal
ambiguity: ‘ambiguity surrounding the
linkage between action and performance’ (p.
421)
Reed and DeFillipi (1990) Explained that tacitness, complexity and
specificity were sources of causal ambiguity.
Suggested that ‘reinvestment in causally
ambiguous competencies is necessary to
protect’ a firm’s resource-based competitive
advantage (p. 88)
Mosakowski (1997) Explored how causal ambiguity could affect
decision making. Emphasized the need to
develop understanding of how managers in
firms actually experience causal ambiguity
Simonin (1999) Concentrated on the transfer of causally
ambiguous knowledge in alliances.
Investigated the antecedents of causal
ambiguity
King and Zeithaml (2001) Introduced a distinction between linkage
ambiguity and characteristic ambiguity
Blyler and Coff (2003) Examined how social capital could be used
by individuals to appropriate rent even when
their contribution was causally ambiguous
Szulanski, Cappetta and Jensen (2004) Studied the effect of causal ambiguity on
trustworthiness
Ambrosini and Bowman (2005) Proposed a method to elicit causally
ambiguous resources within a firm
Powell, Lovallo and Caringal (2006) Proposed that causal ambiguity is a
property of management perception
King (2007) Developed a model of the sources of causal
ambiguity. Argued that future research into
causal ambiguity should investigate its
impact on firm resources and firm
performance
Building on Ambrosini and Bowman’s (2005) and Powell, Lovallo and Caringal’s (2006)
papers that consider perceptions of causal ambiguity, we explore the moderating
effects of causal ambiguity perceived by managers inside the firm on the
sustainability of their firm’s competitive advantage, and on rent appropriation
(Powell, Lovallo and Caringal, 2006). For this purpose, in the next section we
integrate Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982), King and Zeithaml’s (2001) and Powell,
Lovallo and Caringal’s (2006) work on causal ambiguity to enable us to define the
concept precisely.
Following a review of definitions of causal ambiguity we identify three types of
ambiguity perceived by managers within the firm. In the following section, for each
type of ambiguity we explore the implications for competitive advantage and rent
appropriation. Before concluding with a summarizing figure, having focused so far on
causal ambiguity relating to the current resource stock, we discuss causal
ambiguity and its impact on resource-creation processes.
We make several contributions in this paper. First we show that linkage and
characteristic ambiguity can occur both separately and together. Second, while from
the RBV one can deduce that causal ambiguity has a range of implications for the
sustainability of competitive advantage, as a lack of causal ambiguity may increase
the risk of competitive imitation, we develop these implications by suggesting that
firms may lose their competitive advantage through the mismanagement of
valuable resources. Third, we explore further the connections between causal
ambiguity and value capture.
Our intention is not only to advance our conceptual knowledge, but also to explore
some managerial implications. Managers need to perform a balancing act between
enhancing the creation and leverage of valuable resources within the firm and
simultaneously protecting the firm’s resources from competitive imitation. They
also need to understand how causal ambiguity can hinder or facilitate rent
appropriation. We believe that, by achieving a fuller appreciation of causal ambiguity,
managers should be able to make more informed decisions with respect to the
resource base of their firm.
Defining linkage and characteristic ambiguity
In 2001, King and Zeithaml set out two distinct dimensions of causal ambiguity:
characteristic ambiguity and linkage ambiguity. They explain that linkage
ambiguity is ‘ambiguity among decision makers about the link between
competency and competitive advantage’ (2001, p. 77) and characteristic ambiguity
is ‘ambiguity inherent to the resource itself’ (2001, p. 77). As we are interested in
perceptions of causal ambiguity (Powell, Lovallo and Caringal, 2006) we interpret
characteristic ambiguity as follows: because of the complex nature of the resource
managers are not likely to fully understand how it ‘works’. This complexity is likely to
be due to the fact that many resources are in effect a combination of various
interrelated and complementary tangible and intangible components (we address this
more fully in the discussion). There are a range of factors that can cause linkage
ambiguity. King and Zeithaml (2001), Reed and DeFillipi (1990) and Simonin
(1999) propose that tacitness, complexity and characteristic ambiguity are such
antecedents. Based on Lippman and Rumelt (1982) and Powell, Lovallo and
Caringal (2006), we would add a separate group of ‘managerial variables’ that lead
to linkage ambiguity. For instance, where the size and scope of the firm is
extensive, individual managers may only be able to comprehend a limited sub-set of
its operations. Similarly, newly recruited managers may only have a partial view,
which could become more elaborated through experience. Linkage ambiguity may
also occur where time pressures prevent managers from exploring the full scope of
the firm’s operations. Managers may display functional bias in perceptions (Walsh,
1988), maybe privileging their function’s contribution to success over the
contributions of other functions, and, more generally, managers experience
bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). They engage in cognitive simplification, and
their decision making and information processing are inevitably constrained by
their past experiences. We could also add within this category of managerial variables
ignorance of the existence of a resource, and erroneous beliefs about the impact of
a resource formed through prior experiences, maybe in a different context or set
of circumstances.
In summary, integrating Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982), King and Zeithaml’s
(2001) and Powell, Lovallo and Caringal’s (2006) work, we would argue that linkage
ambiguity is about perceived ambiguity between resources and performance and it
exists where a decision-maker perceives he/she has an incomplete understanding of
the causes of his/her firm’s success. In other words linkage ambiguity relates to
managerial perceptions in relation to a specific resource or bundle of resources and it
is ambiguity about the link between resources and performance. This perceived
incomplete understanding can be caused by characteristic ambiguity, i.e. the
complex nature of the resource itself, or it could result from managerial variables,
like limited tenure, functional bias etc. In short characteristic ambiguity concerns the
obscurity of the inner workings of the resources. This means that characteristic
ambiguity and linkage ambiguity should be considered as separate constructs.
Combinations of linkage and characteristic ambiguity
In what follows, building on our argument so far, we propose four combinations of
causal ambiguity (see Figure 1). The resource, from a manager’s perspective,
either does or does not display linkage ambiguity and either does or does not display
characteristic ambiguity. This generates three combinations of causal ambiguity
(types 1, 2, 3) and one representing the absence of causal ambiguity (type 4).
For each of these combinations we address issues of rent appropriation and the
sustainability of competitive advantage. As we have argued, linkage ambiguity can
be the result of characteristic ambiguity, and/or it can result from a variety of other
variables that impact an individual manager’s understanding of the firm’s value
creation processes. In what follows we explore the three combinations of causal
ambiguity with regard to how rents accrue in firms, how they may persist, and
how and why particular organizational members might be able to appropriate these
rents.
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Figure 1. Combinations of linkage and characteristic ambiguity
Following the RBV argument we know that sustainable competitive advantage
derives from valuable (V), rare (R), difficult to imitate (I) and non-substitutable (N)
resources (Barney, 1991, 2001).1 These resources can be anything within the firm,
i.e. exclusive contracts, relationships with suppliers, retailing facilities, organizational
processes, efficient factories, patents, brands, tacit know-how etc. (Barney, 1991),
and they have either been artfully procured (Makadok, 2001) or they have been built
or created within the firm (Helfat et al., 2007). To generate rents, resources must be
involved in the creation of valuable products or services. In this paper we focus on
value creating activities performed by individuals and groups within the boundary of
the firm that fulfil Barney’s VRIN criteria (Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 2003;
1In 2002 Barney formulated the original VRIN criteria differently and proposed the
VIRO (or VRIO) criteria. The V and R are still the same – they relate to value and
rarity. The I relates to imitability (and substitutability as in effect a resource that
can be substituted for is in essence the same as a resource that can be imitated).
The O is about organization, specifically whether a firm has other policies and
procedures supporting the exploitation of VRIN resources (Barney and Hesterly,
2006). In other words a VRIN resource can be a source of sustainable
competitive advantage but to be able to exploit the VRIN resource fully a firm
must be organized to do so.
Orlikowski, 2002; Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1996; Whittington, 1996).2 Valuable
activities involve both people and the resources that surround them; using the
broad sense of the word resource, activities are a combination or configuration of
resources. Quite how this configuration ‘works’ to deliver advantage may not be well
understood by some managers, i.e. it may be characteristically ambiguous. This may
happen even if the individual components that combine into the configuration are
readily comprehended; what is not clear are the inner workings, the synergistic
interactions between the components of the system that collectively deliver
advantage.
We assume a stream of rents flowing to the firm, these rents being generated by
valuable activities and the resource configuration. We focus on the effects of
managerial perceptions of causal ambiguity on competitive advantage and its
sustainability and we also examine how causal ambiguity may affect the capture of
rents within the firm. For the purposes of this exploration we assume that
managers act in the interests of the firm’s shareholders. Following Coff (1999) we
suggest that the perceived presence or absence of causal ambiguity affects the
perceived bargaining power of people within the firm, and we assume that rents
not appropriated by employees are available for subsequent dispersal to other
stakeholders (shareholders, other suppliers etc).
We now explore each of our combinations of causal ambiguity to understand what
they mean in terms of the management of valuable activities, the sustainability of
competitive advantage and rent appropriation.
Type 1: Managers perceive both linkage and characteristic ambiguity
The impact on competitive advantage
Here managers are not only unclear whether the activity is valuable, but they are
also unable to fully comprehend how it is performed. One obvious danger here
2We recognize that not all people or all human actions are a source of competitive
advantage; generic activities are a source of competitive parity, unproductive
activities destroy value. We also acknowledge that VRIN resources can be
anything within the firm and hence some tangible resources may be critical and be
sources of superior performance.
is that the activity may be vulnerable to inappropriate changes. An activity whose link
with competitive advantage is not understood could be outsourced, altered to be
‘improved’, or even eliminated altogether to cut costs. Such an activity could be
changed through the actions of new management entering the firm where they lack
insights into the idiosyncrasies of the firm and its customers. If a recently recruited
executive is expected to implement rapid and significant change causally ambiguous
activities may be the first to be eliminated, because they are not seen to matter.
If causal ambiguity is due to characteristic ambiguity and particularly tacitness
or path dependency in the development of a firm-specific bundle of activities (Kor and
Mahoney, 2004), then these valuable activities, if left alone, are likely to be a
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Reed and DeFillipi,
1990). If both managers and competitors do not fully comprehend the causes of
the firm’s competitive advantage, because it is created by tacit, difficult to express
and codify activities, then this advantage is likely to be sustained because
managed imitation cannot take place. There is still, however, the possibility that
the effect or impact of these activities may be achieved by other firms through
other means, i.e. substitution (McEvily, Das and McCabe, 2000). The problem when
managers perceive both types of ambiguity is that, because of the tacit and complex
nature of such activity, when lost, because it is not stored in any knowledge
management systems, it may be difficult to reinstate even if, with later insight,
its value is recognized.
Hence an activity that is both linkage and characteristically ambiguous is likely
to be a source of sustainable advantage. However, the lack of perceived
understanding of its significance puts it at risk; the competitive advantage may only
be sustained by luck. Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2005) explain the case of
Plasco, a manufacturer of plastic goods which was outperforming its competitors.
Up to a strategic intervention aimed at surfacing causes of success, nobody in the
company had realized that employees were systematically breaking the rules, the
standard procedures set out by management, in order to please powerful
customers. This meant that it was easier to respond to customer demand. If
managers tried to ensure that the ‘proper’ procedures were followed they could well
have lost their advantage, as they would have probably become less flexible.
Where type 1 ambiguity occurs it is possible that those performing these valuable
but under-appreciated activities may autonomously choose to change their
behaviours. If what they do is not seen to be special or valuable by their managers
they may decide to alter their performance in some way. We can refer to Feldman
and Pentland’s (2003) distinction between ‘ostensive routines’, the structure or
abstract understanding of the routine, and ‘performative routines’, the actual
performance of the routine, the routine in practice. It may be that the ostensive
activity continues to be performed as before; however, it might be that variations in
the actual performance of the valuable activity take place. Subtle and detailed
differences between competing firms are often strategically important (Whittington,
1996), and hence any variations may be detrimental to the firm, and managers may
not realize because of the presence of causal ambiguity that these variations have
occurred.
The impact on rent capture
In the type 1 situation managers do not fully comprehend the link between the
activity and firm performance, nor do they understand the activity itself. The
activity may involve subtle tacit routines or complex interrelationships between the
staff involved in the activity (Reed and DeFillipi, 1990). Those involved in the valuable
activity may not know the ‘true’ value of their work, its ultimate impact on firm
performance. In these circumstances, because the contribution of the activity is
obscure, the rents it creates are more likely to remain within the firm, and hence
help to boost profits (Coff, 1999). Where those performers of these valuable
activities are not cognizant of the firm’s dependence on their efforts, there will be
no behavioural uncertainty (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy, 2005) and hence
employees are unlikely to try to ‘hold up’ the firm, i.e. to try to appropriate these
rents (Williamson, 1985). They are unlikely to seek to capture the rents they help to
create in the form of higher salaries (Kotowitz, 1989; Williamson, 1975).
However, Blyler and Coff (2003) argue that more people can make a demand on
the rents generated when managers perceive linkage causal ambiguity as there is no
available proof that their demands are well grounded or not. They suggest that
because of this linkage ambiguity people can take credit for success as the causality is
unclear, and hence the ‘claims on the rent may seem legitimate since they would
be hard to disprove’ (Blyler and Coff, 2003, p. 682). Some claims may be perceived
to be legitimate, but some not and may not be perceived by others to be fair, but
people with strong social capital and power may have few problems in making and
sustaining these claims. This suggests that perceiving characteristic and linkage
ambiguity is a source of transactions costs. It may also make it costly and difficult to
write contracts and enforce performance norms in these ambiguous circumstances.
Causal ambiguity may therefore reduce the rent appropriated as a whole by the firm
(Foss and Foss, 2005). This suggests that causal ambiguity creates another trade-
off between protecting against the amount of rent captured by organizational
members and the loss of rent due to transaction costs from protection measures
set up to avoid this rent capture (Foss and Foss, 2005). However, a counter
argument would be that if managers acting in the interests of the firm owners
do not perceive activities to be special in any way, as here in the type 1 case, we
could surmise that they may be unlikely to give in to any attempts to ‘hold up’ the
firm.
Both arguments, while at first sight opposing, can be reduced to one suggestion:
when characteristic and linkage ambiguity is perceived the rent captured by those
performing the causally ambiguous valuable activity will be determined by the
bargaining power they are perceived to have and that they choose to exercise. It can
also reflect the difference in assumptions between the RBV and transaction cost
theory. The latter ‘emphasizes the downside associated with [...] uncertainty in
describing how [it . ..] may lead to misappropriation or hold-up problems’ (Williamson,
1985). In contrast, ‘[the RBV . . .] emphasizes the upside profit creating
opportunities associated with uncertainty’ (Leiblein, 2003, p. 952). In other words,
causal ambiguity is a negative factor when we follow the transaction cost
argument as it creates measurement and monitoring problems and hence increases
transaction costs (Madhok, 2002), and for the RBV it may have both positive and
negative aspects. However, as noted by Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy (2005) it is
appropriate to view both theories as complementary, as in order to achieve the best
possible profits firms should consider both transaction cost minimization and
creating value from idiosyncratic activities.
Type 2: Managers perceive linkage ambiguity but no characteristic
ambiguity
The impact on competitive advantage
In this case the activity is understood, but managers do not perceive the link
between the activity and competitive advantage; they are not aware of its ‘true’
value. There are many examples of firms where managers did not understand
the value of activities, although they were fully cognizant of the nature of the
activities. The examples include failures that some firms have suffered from
downsizing, notably in the 1990s when many business process reengineering
projects took place. Kilpatrick (1999) narrates in detail what happened in an
American hospital when the management decided to reduce the workforce
after a $16 million budget shortfall. She explains how those in charge were not
knowledgeable about the value of the activities of the department whose workforce
was to be cut and how some of the employees who were dismissed were critical to the
day-to-day operation of the hospital. Here the activities were understood by
managers but their significance was not appreciated.
Managers may be unaware of the value significance of some activities due to
factors other than characteristic ambiguity, such as the size of the organization and
the complexity of its processes (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). They may feel driven
to improve performance, but may lack insight into the true value generating
activities of the firm. This may, for instance, lead them to focus primarily on generic
cost reduction strategies, which may be unable to differentiate between high and low
value activities, risking the elimination of the good along with the bad.
The managerial climate and predominant leadership style in some firms may also
further exacerbate these problems. Where there are limited communications,
poor relationships across organizational levels, particularly in a ‘barren’
organizational context (Szulanski, 1996) or where agency tensions are heightened
(Lee and O’Neill, 2003), people engaged in valuable activities may not normally
or comfortably engage in dialogue with managers. In a climate of cost reduction
there may be even less incentive to do so. Where managers make changes in these
circumstances, changes that organizational members know will be detrimental to for
example service delivery, a culture of cynicism, resignation and disillusionment may
be promoted. Drastic downsizing and cost cutting may be performed by managers
new to the business, who have been drafted in especially to effect these unpopular
measures. By coming in from outside, they are less likely to have their actions
affected by emotional commitments to past practices, individuals or groups, but the
downside is they may cut out activities that contribute to advantage (Black and Boal,
1994). Alternatively, advantage is likely to be sustained if managers seek to
develop a culture that encourages interaction and the sharing of knowledge
between organizational members, and hence reduces linkage ambiguity.
Losing advantage through managerial action is not the only danger facing a firm. It
may also lose its advantage through competitive imitation. An activity that is not
characteristically ambiguous could be codified and people moving to another firm
might be in a position to explain what they used to do. Their new employers may be
able to recognize the value of the activity and ask the newcomers to introduce
these activities, i.e. for their new employers these practices are neither
characteristically nor linkage ambiguous.
The impact on rent capture
Where activities do not display any ambiguity one might expect an informed
negotiation with regard to rent appropriation. However, where managers perceive
linkage ambiguity but not characteristic ambiguity the situation is probably more
complex. As explained earlier, the managers’ linkage ambiguity may be due to
poor organizational climate and the lack of communication between those involved
in the activity and managers, but here in this case there is no characteristic
ambiguity. We could surmise that in this situation organizations may be exposed to
moral hazard as those involved in a valuable activity have an incentive to make
this well understood by managers and may demand additional reward for their
contribution to the firm’s success (Coff, 1999; Hennart, 1993), but those performers
of the valuable activities may be in a stronger position to capture their portion of the
rents they generate if they can be rewarded without having to ‘show their cards’. Here
we are faced with the familiar agency problem of organizational members
pursuing their own interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Roberts,
McNulty and Stiles, 2005).
However, practically it is likely that it may be difficult for them not to inform the
managers about the value of the activities in order to bargain up their share of
the value they help create, and hence such a situation is likely to be short lived.
Managers are unlikely to concede to demands where they do not perceive the
activities in question to be particularly special or valuable to the firm. Moreover we
can also invoke the argument of context specificity and interdependence. If the
activity is firm specific or there are strong interdependences between the activity and
other assets, those involved in the valuable activity may not be able to
convincingly argue that their skills can be readily transferred to a rival firm,
because managers may realize that the activity may not be worth as much to
another firm (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002). This
situation is likely to be found in complex organizations and notably in transnational
corporations where there are extensive interconnections across the structure,
where the modus operandi is collaboration and integration with a strong reliance on
relationships both inside and outside the corporation (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000;
Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998).
Type 3: Managers do not perceive linkage ambiguity but perceive
characteristic ambiguity
The impact on competitive advantage
In this situation managers are aware that some activities are sources of advantage
but they do not fully comprehend how the activity is performed. Activities
may be so complex that the workings of the valuable activities remain obscure or
they are not fully comprehended because they have tacit elements (Castanias and
Helfat, 1991).
An example of an activity displaying characteristic ambiguity but no linkage
ambiguity could be that described at Credit Suisse First Boston (see Blyler and Coff,
2003). Frank Quattrone and his 100 member team were central to Morgan
Grenfell’s success, a fact that was well known in the industry. Executives at Credit
Suisse realized they were not able to replicate Morgan Grenfell’s sources of success so
they acquired Quattrone and the whole team. A similar conclusion was
reached by Groysberg and Abrahams (2006) who explained that organizations
were recruiting high-functioning teams who had been working together effectively,
rather than trying to recruit specific individuals. Similarly Groysberg and Lee (2008)
concluded that Wall Street analysts are very dependent on the quality of their
colleagues and that before considering moves they should take this into
consideration as they may find that they may not be able to perform as well in a
different organizational context. This suggests an absence of linkage causal
ambiguity, but the presence of characteristic ambiguity.
An interesting question is whether firms should strive to reduce characteristic
ambiguity or actively seek to encourage it. We could take the example of Formula 1
teams to examine this.
‘Some Formula 1 teams are so concerned about secrecy and the loss of intellectual
property that they literally build physical walls around departments to ensure that
if someone leaves from the transmission department, they won’t have an idea of
what’s going on in the suspension department... . In contrast we have the view that
providing we are progressing and developing it is more positive to have an open
internal exchange of information than the risk of losing intellectual property when
somebody goes’ (Patrick Head at Williams F1 quoted in Jenkins, Pasternak and West,
2005, p. 145). In the F1 teams referred to at the start of the quote, characteristic
ambiguity is deliberately fostered. Those involved in the VRIN activity may be
unclear about how their work impacts on the ultimate performance of the car.
Although they would be aware of the importance of improvements in
transmission systems, they are not aware of the interaction effects between their
efforts and the efforts of other sub-teams and one could probably assume that
nobody has a perfect overall understanding. Maybe by keeping the sub-teams
physically separated the F1 team reduces the threat of imitation by a rival team
should an individual leave.
The Williams F1 team, on the other hand, is keen to facilitate knowledge transfer in
order to innovate and hence the managers strive to reduce characteristic ambiguity.
These instances can also be seen as an illustration of the difference between
architectural knowledge and component knowledge. Architectural knowledge requires
an understanding of the differing elements of a system, but is particularly
concerned with the way the different components are linked and integrated to
form a coherent whole, whereas component knowledge relates to each of those
specific elements (Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Hence another way of
interpreting these F1 firms is that managers may not perceive linkage ambiguity where
they have architectural knowledge. However, if, as is likely, they do not fully
understand how each distinct activity contributes to the ‘bigger picture’, they
experience characteristic ambiguity.
These examples also illustrate a paradox of causal ambiguity. If managers
encourage a shared understanding of how the firm gains advantage by trying
to reduce characteristic ambiguity, the firm increases the risks of competitive
imitation. As explained by Zander and Kogut (1995), resources based on
knowledge that can be codified and then communicated are most likely to be
replicated and then imitated. However, if managers act to restrict codification or the
passing on of knowledge the firm may lose opportunities for innovation (Winter,
1995). Characteristic ambiguity may make it difficult for a firm to transfer valuable
activities to other parts of the organization, but it also makes it difficult for
competitors to imitate these uncodified activities. Nevertheless where managers are
aware of the value of an activity, even though it may be characteristically
ambiguous to them, they should be able to take the necessary steps to protect it,
thereby prolonging competitive advantage.
This aspect of causal ambiguity represents a ‘mixed blessing’ for both strategic
management scholars (Lado et al., 2006, p. 121) and resource owners. A key
question is whether replication within the firm and imitation by competitors are
inextricably linked (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Rivkin, 2001; Winter, 1995; Zander
and Kogut, 1995). The answer perhaps unsurprisingly is that it depends on a range
of phenomena and notably the complexity, observability or tacitness of the resource
(see Winter, 1995, p. 170, for a full list); in other words it depends on how
characteristically ambiguous the resource is. While resources that are not
characteristically ambiguous are most likely to be replicated and imitated (Zander
and Kogut, 1995), Rivkin (2001) argues that on the other hand highly characteristic
ambiguous resources are most unlikely to be replicated internally or imitated by
rivals. Rivkin (2001, p. 275) proposes that ‘‘‘moderate” levels of complexity can
make imitation more difficult than replication’. When the resource is too
complicated any efforts to replicate are likely to be critically affected by any small
errors in the replicated resource. When the resource is moderately complex then the
original firm can use its past experience (its original ‘template’) to replicate the
resource, but the resource is complicated enough to make imitation difficult for
competitors. This is the case because the replicator, as explained by Rivkin (2001),
has an informational edge: the original firm has an understanding of the original
resource-creation process.
The impact on rent capture
If the activity is characteristically ambiguous because it is tacit or complex and
involves interactions within a web of people, no single individual involved may be
aware of the true value of their efforts, or how they each contribute to overall
performance (in other words the activity is linkage ambiguous to its performers),
and as a consequence the motivations to seek to bargain up their share of the value
created will be low. The rent stream generated by this activity is thus more likely to
be retained by the firm, rather than captured by the performers of the valuable
activity. In this sense we can surmise that it would probably be in the
interests of the managers (acting in the interests of shareholders) to prolong this
situation. However, whilst in terms of value capture this may seem positive to the
firm, it may not be a very motivating situation for people who may want to know
how they directly contribute to performance. They may cease performing in the
same way. This may at first sight be an unlikely problem for a firm. However, in
many mature markets advantage may be gained and sustained through quite subtle
and seemingly trivial differences between products/services and the ways they are
marketed and delivered. If the value of these small but important differences is
not understood across those involved in the valuable activity, they may eliminate
them, and they may not think it necessary to ensure that new recruits perform
them.
While characteristic ambiguity can be positive for value capture it may be negative
in terms of organizational learning and hence negative for the long-term future of
the firm, so it might actually be beneficial to reduce ambiguity. So, in order to
maintain, develop and transfer these valuable activities people need to share
their experience, to have exchanges with other organizational members, as
socialization, interaction and cooperation are all key enablers for the
sustainability and development of characteristically ambiguous practices
(Orlikowski, 2002). Thus managers may wish to adopt learning strategies and
foster collaboration (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). This could be all the more
critical if the activity is firm specific and tacit. Indeed if the activity is tacit and critical
to value creation, managers should endeavour to protect it knowing that because
of its embedded, idiosyncratic and complex nature the people involved in the
activity cannot be easily replaced. Hence if managers want to explore and exploit
these valuable activities, they may want to attempt the fostering of conditions
that circumvent ambiguity and promote knowledge transfer, such as collective
discussions, debriefing sessions and performance evaluation processes. By sharing
their experiences organizational members can achieve an improved level of
understanding of the ‘causal mechanisms intervening between the actions required
to execute a certain task and the performance outcomes produced’ (Zollo and
Winter, 2002, p. 342).
The challenge to managers is again to promote the spreading of valuable practices in
ways that do not increase the likelihood of competitor replication, and to do so
without provoking those involved in the valuable activity to bargain up their share
of the rents they create by drawing attention to their idiosyncratic and valuable
activities. In many respects it could be in this situation where firms may benefit
from developing a stewardship approach to ensure that the goals of everybody are
in some sense aligned (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). They may be able
to do so by developing high levels of organizational identification (Mael and Ashford,
1992), or by ensuring that the firm has motivating rent sharing strategies (Coff,
1997). In short managers may want to ensure that they promote pro-
organizational behaviour such as a collectivist culture, low power distances and an
involvement-oriented situation (Tosi et al., 2003), i.e. a work context in which,
according to stewardship theory, individuals will act in the firm’s interest (Tosi et al.,
2003).
Do managers
recognise the
value of the
activity
Do managers
comprehend the
workings of the
activity?
Do managers
comprehend the
workings of the
activity?
• Protect the activity
• Leverage
• Activity unlikely to be source of
sustainable competitive advantage
Type
4
• Protect the activity
• Difficult to leverage
• Balancing risk: codify and risk imitation
or codify and better manage the activity
• Risk of imitation
• Risk of destruction
• Need positive organisational climate
• Protect the activity
• Risk of destruction
• Likely source of sustainable competitive
advantage
Type
3
Type
2
Type
1
Yes
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Figure 2. Key managerial issues emanating from causal ambiguity
Type 4: Managers perceive neither linkage nor characteristic ambiguity
Type 4 refers to an absence of causal ambiguity. We could assume that type 4
conditions represent the bulk of organizational activity that is addressed in
normal managerial behaviour and discourse, particularly where managerial
prescriptions are being discussed. If there is no ambiguity stemming from these
activities it means that it is likely that they are understood and can be actively
and appropriately managed. If the valuable aspect of the activity is particularly well
understood it can also potentially be made more efficient or even more effective, so
as to further enhance its value. However, if there is no causal ambiguity or other
isolating mechanisms, i.e. ‘any knowledge, physical, or legal barriers that may
prevent replication’ (Lepak, Smith and Taylor, 2007, p. 188) such as firm–social
network specificity or specialized knowledge, there is a risk that the valuable activity
may readily be spread to other firms (Badaracco, 1991; Barney, 1991). Non-
causally ambiguous activities are unlikely to be unique for long. Once other rival firms
have managed to imitate these activities they may become a source of competitive
parity (Barney, 1995).
The descriptions of the various combinations represent likely scenarios that
managers may face. They are summarized in Figure 2. Of course our explanations
are simplified abstractions from reality and they do not fully reflect the
complexity of organizations. This, however, shows some of the difficulties
managers have to deal with in trying to manage sources of advantage. We
could suggest that causal ambiguity is less likely to be present and problematic in
organizations where learning from experience, learning by doing and knowledge
transfer in general is favoured (Simonin, 1999), and where organization structures
and systems are flexible and fluid (Grant, 1996). It can also be suggested that
managers may be better off having a stewardship perspective on corporate
governance that emphasizes collaboration rather than a pure agency approach (Coff,
1999; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).
Discussion
We have focused on activities; however, as noted earlier the RBV takes a wider
perspective which encompasses anything within the firm that can be identified as rent
generating. Generally though, while some tangible inputs may be rare and
inimitable and, if valuable, a source of advantage, resources that are non-human, e.g.
machinery, products, systems, are likely to be more susceptible to being imitated
over time (Hunt and Morgan, 1995). Also, in practice resources rarely operate in
isolation as value creation involves interactions and synergistic effects between
bundles of resources. It may be difficult to identify how a specific resource contributes
to competitive advantage as advantage is based on a complex pattern of interlinked
physical, informational, relational etc. factors and a single specific resource is
unlikely to be isolatable as the sole source of firm advantage. The value of a resource
is often contingent upon the presence of other resources (Dierickx and Cool, 1989;
Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). In other words our discussion of causal ambiguity and
notably the impact on competitive advantage could be extended to the entire set of a
firm’s resources.
Morgan and Hunt (1999) explain that when dealing with resources managers have to
be aware that there are four main requirements. (1) managers must acquire or develop
resources; (2) they must combine resources so that they develop a unique and
valuable combination of resources; (3) they must ensure that resources are used in
the right markets as resources that are valuable in one competitive context may
not be as effective in another (Castanias and Helfat, 1991); and (4) they must maintain
and protect the resources as they are used, in other words ‘organizations must
continuously reinvest in the resources that it anticipates will best serve its strategy’
(Morgan and Hunt, 1999, p. 283). Clearly these four tasks become much more
challenging in the presence of ambiguity.
Managers are aware that standing still is most probably not an option when the firm
depends totally or partially on resources that may be subject to imitation or produce
diminishing returns (Pachedo-de-Almeida and Zemsky, 2007) or that could become
irrelevant because of changes in the environment (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).
For instance cost reducing processes or quality control systems may have been fully
exploited and hence other resources need to be developed. Also some resources yield
less and less as they are used, irrespective of competitor imitation. These issues of
diminishing returns and sustainability of advantage deriving from resources are closely
related to the types of resources the firm relies upon. For instance physical
resources such as machinery or location are most likely to be subject to
diminishing returns; hence the advantage deriving directly from them will not be
sustainable. On the other hand relational resources such as trust or informational
resources such as organizational learning (Hunt and Morgan, 1995) are likely to
be enduring sources of advantage as they are difficult to imitate and their value does
not diminish with use. Indeed some resources display increasing returns with use
and may even have simultaneous uses (Collis and Montgomery, 1995).
These issues compounded with the fact that resources can be inadvertently
destroyed highlight the importance of causal ambiguity for managers. Without
being clear what causes advantage or understanding the inner working of their
set of resources managers are unlikely to be able to reliably assess how to either
maintain the value of their resources or enhance their resource base, or
determine whether these resources need to be altered in view of exogenous changes
or because the resources have been degraded through use.
Thus far we have focused on the problems and issues associated with managerial
perceptions of ambiguity in relation to the extant stock of valuable activities. Next
before concluding we turn our attention to causal ambiguity and the resource-
creation process.
Resources can be created or acquired (Barney, 1986; Makadok, 2001) in various
ways. New resources can be the outcome of luck, accident, ad hoc interventions or
dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities are the processes through which a firm’s
resource base is modified. They are ‘the capacity of an organization to purposefully
create, extend or modify its resource base’ (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 1; emphasis
added). Managers deploy dynamic capabilities to sustain or enhance performance; in
other words they do not perceive any linkage ambiguity. They employ these
processes deliberately because they believe they would impact on performance.
However, these dynamic capabilities, for instance new product development
activities or learning (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano and Shuen,
1997) may well be characteristically ambiguous to managers, i.e. they display type 3
ambiguity.
The definition of dynamic capabilities emphasizes the deliberate aspect of the
resource-creation processes (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Helfat et al., 2007);
however, these processes often have a strong emergent quality (Mintzberg and
Waters, 1985). Resources that are socially complex and that have been built up over
time (Barney, 1995) may not have resulted from deliberately managed processes.
These resource-creation processes may display both characteristic and linkage
ambiguity (type 1). Take for instance the example of Delta, a software company
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2005). It had essentially one product which had been
developed a decade earlier. Since that time the firm had exploited this product, and
they had incrementally developed it. The current challenge facing the executives was
that they were unsure how the original product was created, and were unclear about
whether and how they might be able to recreate the conditions to enable new
products to be developed. Thus the past resource-creation process is causally
ambiguous, which poses a serious challenge to the management who recognize that
they need to innovate in order to sustain advantage. Because of ambiguity
managers may have to ‘reinvent the wheel’ and hence lose valuable time and money in
finding ways of renewing their resource base. Of course, resource-creation processes
may not be causally ambiguous to those involved in them. However, over time as
individuals leave the firm and are replaced by others who have had no experience of
these processes knowledge about what was done and how it was done may no
longer be accessible. Here we could not label this as a problem of ambiguity, but
one of non-involvement leading to ignorance.
Thus causal ambiguity is not only an issue for the management of a firm’s current
stock of valuable resources but also an issue for the future development of the
resource stock. The discussion also shows that one cannot equate resource creation
with dynamic capabilities alone. They are only part of the process; emergent,
non-deliberate processes or luck also matter.
Conclusion
In this paper we have contributed to our understanding of causal ambiguity by first
explaining that linkage and characteristic ambiguity could both occur independently
or in tandem. We have also advanced current knowledge on the implications for the
sustainability of competitive advantage by suggesting that advantage could be
inadvertently eradicated by managerial actions, and lastly we have explored the
impact of causal ambiguity on value appropriation in the firm.
In Figure 3 we summarize the main conclusions from our exploration of causal
ambiguity. Reading from the left of the figure, we identify three antecedents of
internal causal ambiguity: resource-creation processes, managerial variables and the
resources themselves. We have explained how resource-creation processes can
generate ambiguity, and resources that are complex can create characteristic
ambiguity. We have also identified a variety of managerial variables, e.g. limited
tenure in the firm, as precursors of ambiguity. The arrow from internal
causal ambiguity back to the resource stock represents the possibility that
ambiguity can lead to managers inadvertently destroying some subtle sources of
advantage.
From the RBV literature we know that resources generate rents and they can also
create external ambiguity reducing the likelihood of competitor imitation, thus
leading to the sustaining of the rent stream. Along the top of Figure 3 we have
represented the effect of managerial ambiguity on employee bargaining power.
Where employees have strong bargaining power they may be able to appropriate a
higher proportion of the rents. Thus bargaining power moderates the volume of
profits captured by the firm.
Managerial
variables
Resource Creation
Processes
External
Causal
Ambiguity
Competitor
Imitation
Internal Causal
Ambiguity
Employee
Bargaining
Power
Resource
Stock Rents Profits
-
-
-
Figure 3. Causal ambiguity and rent capture
We have argued that linkage ambiguity is about ambiguity between resources and
performance within the firm and it exists where a decision-maker perceives
he/she has an incomplete understanding of the causes of his/her firm’s success, due to
variables such as firm size or bounded rationality or to characteristic ambiguity.
Second, we have also proposed that causal ambiguity is multi-faceted and could
essentially take three forms. By proposing these combinations of causal ambiguity we
have addressed the issue of rent appropriation as well as rent generation in the
presence of causal ambiguity (which as argued by Alvarez and Barney (2004) has not
been featured in many RBV contributions). We have also demonstrated the
relevance of causal ambiguity to management practice and in so doing we have made
some progress towards making the RBV operationally valid (Priem and Butler, 2001).
We have argued that managers face differing challenges depending on the
combinations of causal ambiguity they experience. We have raised issues concerning
the likely role of managers in relation to rent generating activities, and have
suggested some implications for the longevity of rent streams likely to accrue to activity
types categorized by the causal ambiguity they display. We have also suggested
that causal ambiguity is a concept not only relevant to a firm’s current resource
stock but also to the resource-creation process. We could suggest that our
–
–
–
arguments are akin to those of Penrose (1959) and Lockett and Thompson (2004)
suggesting that managers are a firm’s ultimate constraint.
As a final note we would like to suggest some avenues for future research. We
suggest that the three combinations of causal ambiguity could be researched
empirically to find evidence of their existence and to understand better the
circumstances in which they occur, e.g. are there differences between industries,
task stability etc. It might also be helpful to study how different managers may deal
with causal ambiguity and how causal ambiguity impacts on ‘what managers do’
(Hales, 1999).
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